This paper considers a linear-quadratic (LQ) mean field control problem involving a major player and a large number of minor players, where the dynamics and costs depend on random parameters. The objective is to optimize a social cost as a weighted sum of the individual costs under decentralized information. We apply the person-by-person optimality principle in team decision theory to the finite population model to construct two limiting variational problems whose solutions, subject to the requirement of consistent mean field approximations, yield a system of forwardbackward stochastic differential equations (FBSDEs). We show the existence and uniqueness of a solution to the FBSDEs and obtain decentralized strategies nearly achieving social optimality in the original large but finite population model.
Introduction
Mean field dynamic decision problems have been extensively studied in the literature [5, 9, 11, 19, 20, 21, 29, 30, 40] , and a central goal is to obtain decentralized strategies based on limited information for individual agents. In a noncooperative game theoretic context, decentralized solutions are developed in [19, 21] by applying consistent mean field approximations.
In a basic mean field decision model, all players (or agents) have comparably small influence and may be called peers. A modified modeling framework is to introduce one or a few major players interacting with a large number of minor players. Traditionally, models differentiating the strength of players have been studied in cooperative game theory, and they are customarily called mixed games with the players according called mixed players [16] ; such literature only dealt with static models. The work [17] investigates an LQ mean field game involving a major player. The consideration of major and minor players in mean field control has attracted considerable interest addressing different nonlinear modeling aspects [8, 12, 35] . See [4, 33] for extension to hierarchical games, and [27] for the analysis of evolutionary games and their deterministic mean field limit under a principle agent.
On the other hand, cooperation in dynamic multi-agent decision problems is traditionally a well studied subject. For general cooperative differential games using various optimality notions, see [39, 41, 44] . Naturally, cooperative decision making in mean field models is of interest, especially from the point of view of addressing complexity [20, 40] . Such decision problems may be referred to as mean field teams for which the decision makers will also be called players or agents. The work [20] introduced an LQ social optimization problem where all the agents cooperatively minimize a social cost as the sum of their individual costs, and it shows that the consistency based approach in mean field games may be extended to this model by combining with a person-by-person optimality principle in team decision theory [24, 42] . The central result is the so-called social optimality theorem which states that the optimality loss of the obtained decentralized strategies becomes negligible when the population size goes to infinity [20] . The social optimum may be regarded as a specific Pareto optimum for the constituent agents. A mean field team is studied in [43] where a Markov jump parameter appears as a common source of randomness for all agents. An LQ mean field team is formulated in [2] by assuming mean field (i.e. the average state of the population) sharing for a given population size N , which gives an optimal control problem with special partial state information. In a mixed player setting, [8] considers a nonlinear diffusion model and assumes that all minor players act as a team to minimize a common cost against the major player. Optimal control of McKean-Vlasov dynamics is analyzed in [28] and under some conditions it is shown that the optimal solution may be interpreted as the limit of the social optimum solution of N -players as N → ∞. Cooperative mean field control has applications in economic theory [36] , collective motion control [1, 38] , and power grids [13] . Furthermore, social optima are useful for studying efficiency of mean field games by providing a performance benchmark [3, 18] .
For mean field teams with mixed players, the analysis in an LQ framework has been formulated in our earlier work [22] , where partial analysis was presented by applying a state space augmentation technique to characterize the dynamics of the random mean field evolution. Later, [23] re-examined the problem by applying the person-by-person optimality principle adopted for the peer model in [20] . This paper further generalizes the model by including coupling in dynamics and random coefficients while [22] only considers cost coupling and deterministic coefficients. Specifically, the model parameters now depend on the Brownian motion of the major player. This suggests that the major player serves as a common source of randomness for all players, which has connections with mean field games with common noise [5, 10, 11] . In fact, the stochastic control literature [7, 37] has considered a similar randomness structure where the system coefficients depend on a smaller filtration, and such modeling has applications in finance [26, 31] .
As in [23] , our solution is to extend the person-by-person optimality argument of [20] to the current setting to deal with random mean field approximations due to the presence of the major player, and we solve two variational problems resulting from the major-minor player interactions. The linear backward stochastic differential equation (BSDE) [6, 32] technique adopted in this paper can treat the random mean field and coefficients in a unified manner. As it turns out, the consideration of the coupling in dynamics will necessitate delicate handling of a two-scale variational problem for the minor player. Note that for the person-by-person optimality principle only one player has control perturbation. This feature is similar to mean field games where the equilibrium is tested by unilateral strategy changes. However, our performance characterization of social optimality must allow simultaneous control variations. The optimal control nature of our problem shares some similarity with mean field type optimal control [14, 45] . However, the later involves only a single decision maker which directly controls the state mean.
Throughout this paper, we use (Ω, F, {F t } t≥0 , P ) to denote an underlying filtered probability space. Let S n be the Euclidean space of n × n real and symmetric matrices, S n + its subset of positive semi-definite matrices, and
= ess sup t,ω |v(t)|. We can similarly define such spaces with other choices of the filtration and the Euclidean space. Given a symmetric matrix M ≥ 0, the quadratic form z T M z may be denoted as |z| 2 M . For a matrix Z, Z col i stands for the ith column of Z. Some variables (such as X ⋆ 0 (t), u ⋆ i (t)) with a superscript of star are used for limiting models afer taking mean field approximations. Let {F W t , t ≥ 0} be the filtration by a Brownian motion {W (t), t ≥ 0}. We use C (or C 1 , etc.) to denote a generic constant which is independent of the population size N + 1 and may change from place to place.
The organization of the paper is as follows. Section 2 formulates the social optimization problem with a major player. Sections 3 and 4 introduce two variational problems with random parameters for the major player and a representative minor player, respectively. The existence and uniqueness of the mean field social optimum solution is presented in section 5. An asymptotic social optimality theorem is established in section 6. Section 7 concludes the paper.
The Mean Field Social Optimization Model
Consider the LQ mean field decision model with a major player A 0 and minor players {A i , 1 ≤ i ≤ N }. At time t ≥ 0, the states of A 0 and A i are, respectively, denoted by X N 0 (t) and X N i (t), 1 ≤ i ≤ N . The dynamics of the N + 1 players are given by a system of linear stochastic differential equations (SDEs):
where
is the coupling term. The states X N 0 , X N i and controls u N 0 , u N i are, respectively, n and n 1 dimensional vectors. The initial states X N 0 (0) = z 0 , X N i (0) = x N i0 , 1 ≤ i ≤ N , are deterministic. The coefficients in the dynamics are random. The noise processes W 0 , W i are n 2 dimensional independent standard Brownian motions adapted to F t . We choose F t as the σ-algebra
The cost for A 0 is given by
where Ψ 0 (X (N ) (t)) = H 0 (t)X (N ) (t) + η 0 (t). The cost for A i , 1 ≤ i ≤ N , is given by
The terms H 1 (t)X N 0 (t) and H 1f X N 0 (T ) indicate the strong influence of the major player. Also, the parameters in the two costs are random.
Below we list the stochastic parameter processes
We introduce the standing assumptions for this paper. (A1) We have
where c 1 > 0 is a fixed deterministic constant. (A2) The terminal cost parameters where ψ(t) (resp., ψ f ) stands for any entry in (2.5)-(2.6) (resp., (2.7)).
For the rest of the paper, for a stochastic process {Z(t), 0 ≤ t ≤ T } appearing in various equations and equalities, we may write Z for Z(t) by suppressing the time variable t for which the interpretation should be clear from the context. For instance, we often drop t in A 0 (t), B 0 (t), X N i (t), Q(t), etc. Throughout the paper, we denote
The mean field social optimization problem
For the mean field social optimization problem, we attempt to minimize the following social cost 8) where u N = (u N 0 , u N 1 , . . . , u N N ) and λ > 0. It is necessary to introduce the scaling factor λ/N in order to obtain a well defined limiting problem when N tends to infinity. In view of the dynamics and costs of the N + 1 players, J 0 and J i , i ≥ 1, are generally of the same order of magnitude. If λ/N were replaced by 1, the limiting control problem would be too insensitive to the performance of the major player and become inappropriate.
For the model of N + 1 players, let the optimal control be denoted by
where eachǔ j belongs to L 2 F (0, T ; R n 1 ). Since the optimal control problem minimizing J
soc is a strictly convex optimization problem with J
→ ∞, suchǔ N exists and is unique. However, this solution is not what we desire to obtain since each player needs centralized information. Instead, it will serve as a starting point for designing decentralized strategies.
The Major Player's Variational Problem
and
Note that we have followed the convention of dropping the time variable t in various places. It can be checked thatX
The first variation of the social cost is given by
which is a linear functional ofũ N 0 . We have the first order variational condition:
Proof. We prove by using the so called person-by-person optimality principle [24] . Take a constant ǫ and letũ N 0 be fixed. Then consider the control (
for all ǫ, and the lemma follows from elementary estimates of the left hand side after an expansion aroundǔ 0 .
The limiting variational problem for the major player
Consider the limiting model
. Hereū and m are used to approximatě u (N ) and X (N ) for large N , respectively. Note that eachǔ j ∈ L 2 F (0, T ; R n 1 ) is a centralized control in that it depends on all Brownian motions. However, as N → ∞, we expect the randomness originated in (W 1 , . . . , W N ) will be averaged out. This has motivated the consideration ofū ∈ L 2
which are intended to approximate δL N 0 (t) and δL N 0f , respectively.
is a solution to VP-(I). We introduce the backward stochastic differential equations (BSDEs) dp 0 (t) = (M 0X
Proof. From the linear BSDEs, we can solve a unique solution (p 0 , p, ξ 0 , ξ). It follows from Itô's formula that
It follows from (3.1) and (3.
The lemma follows.
To analyze (3.7), we introduce the notation:
Lemma 3.3 Q 0 (t) and Q 0f are positive semi-definite for all 0 ≤ t ≤ T .
Proof. Since Q 0 (t), Q(t) are symmetric and Q 0 (t), Q(t) ≥ 0, we can write Q 0 (t) = U T 0 (t)U 0 (t) and Q(t) = U T (t)U (t) for some R n×n -valued random matrices U 0 (t), U (t). Denote
It is clear that Q 0 (t) is symmetric and
The case of Q 0f can be similarly checked.
(3.11)
where 
The Minor Player's Variational Problem
Recall that the controlǔ yields state processesX
Thus,
where we use the notation Y (N )
Lemma 4.1 There exists a constant C independent of N such that
Proof. By solving the linear ODE of (X N 0 ,X 
The lemma follows by applying Schwarz inequality.
When the control changes from (
, the first variations of the costs have the following form
In the above,
See appendix B for the derivation of (4.3). The derivation of E N f is similar and omitted here. We may regard E N 1 as a higher order term relative to the first term in χ −i . Specifically, by Lemma 4.1, we have
We may give a similar upper bound for E|E N f | by using
place of the middle factor of O(·) above.
Proposition 4.3
We have
Proof. The proof is similar to that of Lemma 3.1 and we omit the detail. It can be shown that
where E N 2 can again be treated as a higher order term, and we may similarly rewrite χ 0f + χ if + χ −if .
whereû ⋆ 0 has been determined from the solution of VP-
Remark 4.4 We see that (X ⋆ 0 ,m) andX ⋆ i have different scales when N increases, which is similar to the case of (X N 0 ,X
We give some motivation for introducing the two variational equations in (4.4) containing the 1/N factor. For large N , if the perturbationũ N i is small, J
soc has a change by the order of
Thus we need to look at the optimizing behavior at a finer scale. For this reason the two 1/N scaled terms in (4.4) are significant, and as it turns out below, they ensure that (X ⋆ 0 ,m) provides a good approximation to (X N 0 ,X T (M 0fX
The variational condition in VP-(II) may be regarded as an approximation of the person-by-person optimality property as stated in Proposition 4.3. The proposition below gives insights into the limiting variational problem VP-(II) and provides a justification for the form of (4.4).
Proposition 4.5 Letũ
Recalling (4.2), the proposition follows.
For VP-(II) and the associated variational equations in (4.4), we try to identify adjoint processes (q 0 , q, q i ) such that the equality in VP-(II) is expressed only in terms ofũ ⋆ i and (
where ψ jk and q 0 (T ), q(T ), q i (T ) are to be determined. After elementary although tedious computations, it turns out that (q 0 , q) and (p 0 , p) in (3.7) are determined by exactly the same equations and terminal conditions. Thus, we may use the adjoint processes (p 0 , p, q i ) with the equation of q i appropriately determined. Let (X ⋆ 0 ,m, p 0 , p) be solved first. After the above procedure of constructing the adjoint processes, we introduce the equation system
and VP-(II) has a unique solution given bŷ
Proof. Note that (X ⋆ 0 ,m, p 0 , p, ξ 0 , ξ) is uniquely determined by Theorem 3.4. To proceed, denote
We rewrite
for which we obtain a unique solution by using Lemma A.2 with the vector Brownian motion (W 0 , W i ).
We proceed to show that (4.7) is a solution to VP-(II), where the associated state processes arê 
10)
By Lemma A.1, we solve a unique
Mean Field Social Optimum Solution

Consistency condition
So far we have assumed thatū(t) ∈ L 2 F W 0 (0, T ; R n 1 ), as the approximation ofǔ (N ) (t), is known for solving the variational problems VP-(I) and VP-(II). Below we introduce a procedure to determineū. Let VP-(II) be solved for i = 1, . . . , N , so that (4.6) determineŝ
It is plausible to approximateū byû ⋆(N ) (t) = R −1 λ B T q (N ) (t). We obtain
where ζ
ζ ai and ζ b is given in Lemma 4.7. Recall thatm was introduced to approximateX (N ) . Also, in view of Lemma 4.7, let ζ (N ) a (t) be approximated by ζ a (t). When N → ∞, the above equation of q (N ) is approximated by
. The proof of the next lemma is straightforward and omitted here.
Now we introduce the following consistency condition
We note that a fixed point property is embodied in (5.1). A similar situation also arises in mean field games [19, 21] . Given a generalū ′ ∈ L 2 F W 0 (0, T ; R n 1 ), we solve VP-(I) to obtain a well-defined adjoint process p ∈ L 2 F W 0 (0, T ; R n 1 ), and we use an operator to denote Γ(ū ′ ) = R −1 λ B T p. So (5.1) is equivalent to the fixed point relationū = Γ(ū).
Typically in a mean field game with mixed players, one determines the consistency condition by combining the solutions of the two optimization problems of the major player and a representative minor player [17, 34, 35] . For the present problem, indeed we may determineū viaq after solving VP-(II). However, nowp and p coincide, and for this reason (5.1) is determined by the solution of VP-(I) alone.
The system of FBSDEs
Substitutingū above into (4.6), we introduce the new system
and its solution is used to define
Note that (5.2) differs from (4.6) due to the elimination ofū by the consistency condition. To distinguish the associated processes, we use the new notation X ⋆ 0 and m in (5.2) in place ofX ⋆ 0 and m. However, the variables p 0 , p are reused for the adjoint processes, and their identification should be clear from the context.
We further introduce
and subsequently we uniquely solve
Proof. We follow the notation in (3.8)-(3.10) and further denote
We rewrite the system (5.2) in the form
where Y 0 (T ) = −Q 0f X 0 (T ) − v 0f . By Lemma A.2, we uniquely solve (X 0 , Y 0 , Z), and subsequently (5.3). This completes the proof. Since Q 0 ≥ 0 and Q 0f ≥ 0, let (P ≥ 0, Ψ 1 , . . . , Ψ n 2 ) be the unique solution to the BSRDE
We further uniquely solve
with the terminal condition ϕ(T ) = −v 0f . Then we can write Y 0 (t) = −P(t)X 0 (t) + ϕ(t). For (5.3), denote
Lemma 5.3 For (5.2) and (5.3), there exists a constant C independent of N such that
Proof. Denote y N (t) = X ⋆(N ) (t) − m(t) and r N (t) = q (N ) (t) − p(t). We have
is a solution of the linear BSDE. This implies ψ N (t) = 0 and we further determine
Next, by use of (A1) and r N (t) = −P λ (t)y N (t), we directly estimate sup 0≤t≤T E y N (t) 2 , which further gives a bound on sup 0≤t≤T E r N (t) 2 since P λ is an essentially bounded process.
Asymptotic Social Optimality
Denote by U centr the set of centralized controls consisting of all u = (u 0 , u 1 , . . . , u N ), where each u j ∈ L 2 F (0, T ; R n 1 ). For a general u ∈ U centr , let the corresponding state processes be (X N 0 , X N 1 , . . . , X N N ). We have the following equations
We combine (5.2) and (5.3) to write the following FBSDE
. We use Theorem 5.2 to determine the unique solution ( X ⋆ 0 , m, X ⋆ i , p 0 , p, q i , ξ 0 , ξ, ζ ai , ζ b for (6.1). Denote the set of individual controlŝ
We obtain
λ B T p and p is given by (6.1).
Then y 0 (t) and y N (t) satisfy the following linear ODE:
Since all the parameter processes are bounded and sup 0≤t≤T E| X ⋆(N ) (t)− m(t)| 2 ≤ C(
0 −m 0 | 2 ) by Lemma 5.3, the lemma follows. Now we are ready to state the asymptotic social optimality theorem.
Theorem 6.2 We have
The importance of the theorem comes from the fact that the set of decentralized individual controls (û 0 ,û 1 , . . . ,û N ) can optimize J (N ) soc (u) with little optimality loss in comparison with centralized controls. The rest of this section is devoted to the proof of this theorem.
Some Technical Lemmas
Lemma 6.3 For any u ∈ U centr , we have
Proof. We check the integrands of J 0 and J i to obtain
and similarly,
We further check the terminal costs in J 0 and J i to obtain the estimate.
We give a prior estimate onX 0 andX (N ) . By elementary estimate we can show that there exists a constantĈ 0 independent of N such that
For the estimate below it suffices to consider a set of individual controls u = (u N 0 , . . . , u N N ) ∈ U centr such that
Denote all u satisfying (6.5) by the set U 0 .
Lemma 6.4 For all u ∈ U 0 , there exists C 1 such that
Proof. By use of (A1)-(A3) and direct SDE estimates for (6.1) we can show that,
Thus for u ∈ U 0 , we have
Since R 0 (t), R(t) ≥ c 1 I by (A1), (6.5) implies
where C 2 depends onĈ 0 . By (6.3) and (6.4), we obtain for any 0 ≤ t ≤ T ,
and by applying Schwarz inequality,
This completes the proof. Denote
Lemma 6.5 Suppose u ∈ U centr . Then
If, in addition, u ∈ U 0 , then
Proof. We have
By (6.7)-(6.8), we derive (6.6). The remaining part follows by applying Schwarz theorem and Lemma 6.4.
Proof of Theorem 6.2
In a similar manner, we can show
It follows from (6.9)-(6.10) that
. Lemmas 6.4 and 6.5 imply that
By Lemma 6.3 and the above upper bound for K 1 , for all u ∈ U 0 , we have 11) which is automatically true when u is not in U 0 . Recalling Lemmas 5.3 and 6.1, we complete the proof.
Conclusion
This paper studies an LQ mean field social optimization problem with mixed players. The solution is obtained by exploiting a person-by-person optimality principle and constructing two low dimensional limiting variational problems. This method derives an FBSDE system for the major player and a representative minor player. We prove the existence and uniqueness of the solution to the FBSDE and establish asymptotic social optimality for the resulting decentralized controls of the N + 1 players.
Appendix A Lemma A.1 [37, 25] Assume i) {Ŵ (t) = [Ŵ 1 (t), . . . ,Ŵ l (t)] T , t ≥ 0} is an R l -valued standard Brownian motion; ii) {Â(t),B(t),Q(t),R(t), 0 ≤ t ≤ T } are FŴ t -adapted essentially bounded processes and are R k×k , R k×k 1 , S k + , S k 1 + -valued, respectively;R(t) ≥ αI for a deterministic constant α > 0; andQ f is S k + -valued, FŴ T -measurable, and essentially bounded.
Then the backward stochastic Riccati differential equation (BSRDE)    −dP (t) = Â T P + PÂ − PBR −1BT P +Q (t)dt − l i=1 Ψ i (t)dŴ i (t), P (T ) =Q f has a unique FŴ t -adapted solution (P, Ψ 1 , . . . , Ψ l ) satisfying that P is S k + -valued and essentially bounded, and that each Ψ i ∈ L 2 FŴ (0, T ; S k ). Subsequently, we determine the form of E N 1 as in (4.3).
